How to Stop the Emigration of the Young

The Aspen 1/2012 issue published my text entitled “Is Central Europe dying?” I wrote in its conclusion: “There are no easy solutions ensuring the demographic security of the region. Family policy (even based on the French model) and a liberal immigration policy open to newcomers from all cultures will not be sufficient if they are not used together. In short, what is necessary is both an expensive family policy along the French lines and a liberal immigration policy based on the British or the French model.”

The current text is to some extent a continuation of ideas contained in the article quoted above, but I add my reflections connected with the fact that in the last four years we have not succeeded in stopping emigration from Central and Eastern Europe (for example, according to the Polish Main Statistical Office, 2 196 000 people temporarily resided abroad in 2013, by 2014 this figure went up to 2 320 000, and by 2015 to 2 397 000, 80% of whom stayed abroad for over one year), which exacerbated negative demographic trends. In addition, the migration crisis changed the perspective on immigration from different cultures as an easy instrument stopping the adverse population changes.

In Western Europe, ordinary people and part of the elite are changing their positive attitude to large population movements. It is quite a different narrative than the one contained in the “Bible” of immigrations scholars, i.e. The Age of Immigration by Stephen Castle and Mark J Miller, who perceive the 20th century as the age of population movements with a generally positive attitude to this development on the part of both governments and societies receiving the migrants (Castles, S., M. Miller, 1993). But the same “gurus” of migration experts note that in the early 21st century you can see a distinct change of paradigms – we are shifting towards hostility and non-acceptance of large population movements.

This is due to many factors. As the three most important of them I would name the following:

• the mass nature of immigration,
• the failure of integration policies,
• and the failure of the so-called “welfare state” or social security systems in Europe.

Added to that is the profound sense of cultural threat and the realization that we begin to deal with a war of cultures, and that behind the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of refugees there are the interests of great powers: the ISIS and the big business connected with smuggling humans, brutally exploiting the suffering of many innocent victims. The change of attitude towards immigration is also reflected in the tragic events which have gradually transformed the political narrative. An important part in the change of this narrative was played by the position of the Visegrad Group, which openly opposed the system of mandatory allocation of refugees in their countries.

Until recently it was believed that the emergence of transnational societies and transnational policy is a rather positive thing. However, millions of people today are looking for jobs, a new homeland, or simply a safe place to live. International migration and contemporary nomadism of ethnic groups differing from each other in cultural or social terms slowly begin to be associated with a security threat for states. It is very rare that a single factor would lead to a change in perceiving a social phenomenon – but it can happen that certain extraordinary facts reflect the general dynamics and the main determinants of an era.

The current experiences of Western people and our recent history suggest that we should look at immigrants from other cultures with a certain reserve, but a bit more distant past, the still existing sense of guilt for colonialism, and the awareness that our economies usually profited from exploiting cheap foreign labor force make our officials say that it is necessary to welcome immigrants. Western European societies are already mixed ethnically, which deepens the axiological mess and makes various groups react differently to official policies.

But we should also remember that some immigrants and their children have full voting rights in the countries of Western Europe, and politicians there are very careful not to offend their voters. Instead of just saying No, it is easier to speak vaguely about European “solidarity” and drop this hot potato into the backyard of Central European countries.

We also know from many studies and statistics showing Central Europe as a region for transit rather than settlement that this area is not attractive to immigrants. So you cannot point at immigration policy as an instrument of mitigating demographic and labor problems, when the main target of this policy, that is the immigrant, is not interested.

But if we agree that people (especially the young and economically active) are the engine of innovation, growth of GDP, and wealth of societies, it becomes crucial to create such a development model for Poland and the remaining countries of the region that young people would not treat emigration as their only reasonable life choice.

We must also realize that experiences of countries deeply affected by emigration, such as Ireland, Greece, or Italy, show that immigrants appear on a mass scale, rather than in small numbers or in transit, only when people start to come back from exile.

So we return here to the model of economic development, wealth creation, genuine family policy, and supporting young people: those are the factors which lead to stopping emigration and providing people with incentives to come back. If these boundary conditions are met and if we agree that economies usually profit from cheap foreign labor force (it is enough to look at the data on the impact of Polish immigrants on the British GDP), we have to consider what kind of immigrants we need. It seems to be commonly agreed that societies of our region (and in fact all others – as shown by Brexit, which to some extent was a vote “against” free movement or mass immigration from the new member states) are more ready to accept the “other” who is to some extent “domesticated,” i.e. is of the same ethnic origin or comes from a country which is close to us culturally or historically. So an adequate repatriation policy is necessary. Successful repatriation policies of Germany or Israel may serve as models which can be copied in Central Europe.

Still, we should remember that the first two conditions are crucial. Otherwise people repatriated to Poland or Hungary in small numbers or Ukrainians who arrive in Poland in their mass may go west. It means that we will bear the cost of their education or assimilation, but they will eventually leave. And the demographic situation of our region is extremely difficult.

Some member countries have registered a significant population drop for at least a few years. It is the case especially in the Baltic countries, but also in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The crucial role is played here by the emigration factor I mentioned in Aspen 1/2012 issue.

Forecasts published by Eurostat predict a change in the order of the most populous countries of the EU. The now-leading Germany (82 million in 2015), with 71 million inhabitants in 2060 (a decrease of almost 13%), will have been overtaken by Great Britain (77 million) and France (72 million). Overall, in the period 2010–2060 the population will increase in thirteen of the current member states and decrease in fourteen. The largest relative increase in the number of inhabitants will be seen in Cyprus (66%), Ireland (53%), Luxembourg (52%), the UK (25%), and Sweden (18%), while the largest decrease will be recorded in Bulgaria (about 28%), Latvia (26%), Lithuania (24%), Romania (21%), and Poland (18%).

Against the background of the EU average, the new members, accepted in the successive “expansions,” are characterized (so far) by a generally lower share of people in productive age (which applies particularly to Slovakia, Poland, Romania, and Czechia – in the EU as a whole, the 65+ population accounted on average for 18.9% of the whole in 2015), but we should note that in Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, and Croatia this percentage is already higher than the EU average. The former socialist countries have the worst forecasts for demographic changes, since there the process of population aging is usually combined with population outflow and aggravated by it (except for Slovenia, Czechia, and Hungary, which have not experienced such large-scale emigration as Poland or Lithuania). Societies are aging in all countries of the EU, but the differentiating factor is the starting point, the base year for comparisons – e.g. in 1992, people above 65 years of age constituted 15% of the German society, while for Lithuania and Poland these figures were 11% and 10% respectively. However, if we take 2015 as the base year, we will notice that the dynamics of population aging was faster than in 1992. In Germany, the 65+ population accounted for 21% of the whole, in Lithuania almost 19%, and in Poland 15%. By 2060, this segment of society will have grown by 21% in Poland, 15% in Lithuania, and 13% in Germany. So it turns out that out of all EU countries the aging process will be the most advanced in Poland.

In all countries of Central Europe fertility rate at the best hardly exceeds 1.5 – and in most of them there are more deaths than births, which also accelerates the processes of aging and depopulation. In all these countries the average life expectancy is shorter by 3–5 years than in Western Europe (both for women and men), which also aggravates depopulation.

When the population is younger, we have a large number of working people, who finance social security payments through their taxes. When the population is relatively older, this fiscal base is narrower because of a greater percentage of retired people, who collect their pension cheques rather than paying taxes. The process of population aging changes the structure of benefits and social services, since a greater part of the expenditure is addressed to a group of people who are economically inactive.

However, the process of dynamic population aging in Poland and the region is yet to come. We should do everything possible to create such model of economic and social policy that it will stop the emigration of young people to the West and provide them with incentives to come back. This would also make it possible to retain people from cultures close to ours. Adequate policy of benefits for children, raising the minimal wage and hourly rate (higher incomes), cheaper accommodation, especially in the regions with significant population outflow, are measures which go in the right direction. Another step that should be taken as soon as possible is the return to the previous retirement age (60 for women and 65 for men). In Poland, extending the retirement age was a purely fiscal measure, and should be immediately withdrawn. We know how important family ties are, and we know how difficult it is to care for elderly family members you do not live with. We also know from British studies (Anne White) that the number of elderly people emigrating from Central Europe to Great Britain in order to join their families (those who decided to settle down in the UK) is growing. This is the third link in the emigration chain: younger workers (mostly male)-spouses/children-parents/ grandparents. We should facilitate this process while restrictions to free movement of people to the UK have not been introduced yet.

We have sometimes heard the argument that the consequences of depopulation would be beneficial in a situation when Poland struggles with high unemployment and labor surplus. Let us note two facts undermining this argument. First, let us assume the opposite scenario with no emigration from Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, and other countries of our region in 2004–2015, due, for example, to closed labor markets in the Old Union countries. In such a situation, given the unwillingness (or inability) of the ruling elites to reform political and economic institutions, we would have probably observed a social revolt resulting in changes of the business environment and a deep deregulation of the domestic (e.g. Polish) labor market, leading to an increase of employment and wages. Second, the decreasing number of new births and the shrinking ranks of young employees due to emigration automatically raise the percentage of people in preretirement and retirement age, further boosted by constantly increasing life expectancy. Already 20–30 years after the accession (that is in 2024– 2034) it will turn out that the temporary “relief” which resulted from exporting part of the unemployment among young people and hence lowering the pressure on introducing politically risky reforms will only increase the challenge we are going to be faced with, namely finding the sources of financing the rapidly growing group of retirees, when a significant part of potential taxpayers either emigrated or simply was not born. Another challenge will be finding human resources to take direct or indirect care of the elderly.

Numerically stable or decreasing and at the same time older population will create challenges which will shake the stability of the economic and political sphere and enforce specific technological solutions. The dynamics of consumer demand will go down, as will the saving and investment rate and real estate prices. Young people, naturally mobile and innovative, will have a diminished political impact, while new and powerful interest groups will emerge, expressing conservative needs of the elderly and undermining the political balance of power.

The demographic collapse—although now inevitable—may be temporary. For this to happen and to ease the discomforts brought by it, Poland and other countries of Central Europe need further modernization and creation of efficient institutions which would not waste human capital as they do now, ensure the potential for meeting challenges created by the process of population aging, and be capable of persuading the residents of our region that our place is here, not in exile.