The War Will Not End Soon 

Ukrainians have been linked to Russia by various ties: political, cultural and personal. But that bond is about to end. There will be a final divorce with Russia, says Prof. Yaroslav Hrytsak in an interview with Wojciech Wojtasiewicz.

Wojciech Wojtasiewicz: How do you assess the chances of Ukraine winning the war with Russia? When will it likely take place?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: I rate the chances very high. I am convinced of victory. The only issue is the price. It is already very high, and it will probably get even higher. It’s difficult for me to predict exactly when the war will end, but it will certainly go on for quite a while. 

Will Ukraine manage to regain control of its territory, including Donbas and Crimea? What concessions can Kyiv make to Moscow? 

At present, there is no question of any concessions. Neither the authorities nor the public are thinking of any compromise. Even if the President and the government were to consider any agreement with Moscow, they would encounter strong resistance from Ukrainians. Public opinion is taking a very tough stance. It is to be a war to the end, to full victory. It is about restoring the borders not even from 2014, but from 1991. In this regard, I believe that the war will not end soon. 

The most important thing, however, is not the duration of the war, but its nature. It is very conventional. There were expectations that it would be technological, but the conflict is run under the same conventions as World War I and World War II.

There may not be as many men on the front lines, but the same tactics and the same strategy apply. The war is fought with artillery and tanks. It is positional, just as it was after 1914 in Western Europe. The forces on both sides of the front are not equal. The Russians have more resources, especially human. This is not a war of attrition, but of exhaustion. There will be no final victory in such a war. There will be no victory parade. Kyiv is counting on the collapse of the Kremlin authorities, Putin’s regime. Of course, it is difficult to predict when this will happen. Every successful offensive by the Ukrainian army brings us closer to victory and delegitimizes Putin’s power. We should not expect a blitzkrieg, but if Kyiv manages to succeed sooner rather than later it will only be cause for joy. 

But what if the war is prolonged, war fatigue begins to grow in the West, and supplies of military equipment are curtailed? Won’t Volodymyr Zelensky then be forced by Western politicians into some sort of compromise with Moscow? 

This is quite possible. Even now some European leaders are most eager to force Zelensky to make concessions to Putin, they just don’t talk about it openly. This question will be answered after the Ukrainian offensive, either in the summer or fall, when we can see its results. If it does not turn out to be a success, the Ukrainian President will certainly come under pressure from the West. However, I see no justification for this at present. For now, assurances are being given that Kyiv will be supported for as long as it takes. 

When Putin started the war, he was convinced that it would be a blitzkrieg. That was his strategy. He has changed it. Now he wants to prolong it because time is playing in his favor. We might ask what to do to prevent this war from continuing indefinitely. Much depends on the attitude of the West and its willingness to support Ukraine militarily. The Russian army is clearly weak. It can be beaten. If the Ukrainians have enough weapons, we can then talk about a radical change. As I said, the current war is conventional. However, with the supply of Western weapons, the war may transform from a conventional conflict to a technological one. Then there will be a real possibility of ending the war later this year. Zelensky wants to bring victory as soon as possible, but on the battlefield rather than through negotiations. 

The current war is conventional. However, with the supply of Western weapons, the war may transform from a conventional conflict to a technological one. Then there will be a real possibility of ending the war later this year.

What does the future hold for Russia? Will there be a disintegration of the state and its democratization? 

I have a friend in Israel, his name is Leonid Nezzlin. He fled Russia. He was Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s right-hand man. He told me what the shortest Russian joke is these days. It says: “будущее России” (“the future of Russia”). It simply means that there is no good scenario for Russia. The choice lies between a poor and a catastrophic scenario. 

Personally, I don’t really believe in the disintegration of Russia.

I believe that comparing the possible disintegration of Russia to the collapse of the USSR is unjustified. The collapse of the empire occurred after Mikhail Gorbachev’s more than 5-year rule. The current situation in Russia is completely different. It was difficult to expect the dismantling of the USSR after the death of Joseph Stalin, and the same is true after the 20-year rule of Vladimir Putin. Putin has done everything to prevent social movements, including centrifugal ones, from emerging. In 1991, there were strong centrifugal tendencies, and, importantly, it was Russia headed by Boris Yeltsin that began the dismantling of the Soviet Union. 

Putin has done everything to prevent social movements, including centrifugal ones, from emerging.

Now centrifugal movements could occur in Tatarstan, Chechnya or Dagestan. But even if these three republics were to leave the Russian Federation, Russia as a whole would survive. Russia’s largest colony is Siberia, which is home to the main sources of Russian power, namely gas and oil. Siberia is inhabited by numerous nations, but their leaders have long been abroad. Even if we assumed that Siberia would break away from Russia, which is highly unlikely, the country would still be huge in terms of territory. We should talk not so much about the breakup of Russia, but about its transformation. 

What would its transformation consist of?

It is about destroying a system that has deep roots. It is a system of centralized and absolutist power: authoritarian or totalitarian. The ruler and the state are inseparable. This tradition stretches from the days of the Russian Tsarist Empire, through the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to the present day, with a brief interruption under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Power in Russia should undergo such a transformation that it does not remain in the hands of one man. 

One Russian opposition figure said that Russia’s problems were so deep that Russia couldn’t cope with them alone. Therefore, it must be stripped of its sovereignty in certain aspects. Russia must carry out the necessary reforms under pressure from the West, but also with the participation of Ukrainians. I am convinced that no one is as good an expert on Russia as the Ukrainians, except the Poles. I don’t believe the claims about the unique mentality of Russians that cannot be changed. It’s nonsense. Every society and country can make a change. Take North and South Korea, or East and West Germany as examples. The most important thing is political transformation. All other changes will follow suit. There must be an independent parliament, judiciary and media. All the things that Ukraine has been trying to establish at home, with more or less success, for the past 20 years. 

Has the war influenced the emergence of a new Ukrainian identity? Has there been a unification of the western Ukrainian tradition (the memory of independence after World War I, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Stepan Bandera) with the eastern one (strong ties with the Russian world)?

There has been a mobilization of the country, but we can’t say that a new identity has emerged. I believe that the current Ukrainian identity is essentially the same as it was before the war. It is often said that the current war created the Ukrainian nation. This is foolish. The Ukrainian nation and a sense of Ukrainian identity existed before, of course in its western, eastern and other versions. Ukrainians voted for independence in a referendum in 1991. Support for independence grew whenever the Russian threat increased, such as during the two Chechen wars, the conflict around Tuzla Island in 2003 and the war in Georgia in 2008. However, it culminated with the Russian annexation of Crimea. 

Since the last Maidan and the first phase of Russian aggression, a very strong axis has formed in Ukraine: Lviv-Kyiv-Dnipro. The question has arisen whether this axis can be extended to Kharkiv and Odessa.

Vladimir Putin did not create the Ukrainian identity, but caused its transformation. I believe that over the past years, since the last Maidan and the first phase of Russian aggression, a very strong axis has formed in Ukraine: Lviv-Kyiv-Dnipro. The question has arisen whether this axis can be extended to Kharkiv and Odessa. The latter two cities had a rather shaky status, especially Odessa. I remember very well that when I worked on the staff of the Maidan, the biggest concerns were related to the loyalty of Odessa, which is of strategic importance. The current Russian aggression has put Kharkiv and Odessa on Kyiv’s side. I was recently in Odessa. On the one hand the city is depressing, plunged into darkness due to lack of electricity, on the other hand it is inspiring, all in yellow and blue. Gazeta Wyborcza’s editor-in-chief Adam Michnik once said very aptly that Ukraine’s European future would be defined not by Kyiv, but by Kharkiv and Odessa. Now these cities are clearly in favor of the country’s European integration. The ambivalence is over. 

More and more Ukrainians are switching from Russian to Ukrainian. In addition, historical memory is changing. Until now, Stepan Bandera was a controversial figure more strongly dividing Ukrainians than any other person. For some he was a hero, and for others a criminal. Now Bandera has for the first time become the national hero of all Ukraine. I doubt that those who have changed their minds about Bandera have read anything more about him. They simply began to see him as a symbol of resistance to Russia. Of course, Ukraine and Ukrainians have been linked to Russia by various ties: political, cultural and personal. But that bond is about to end. There will be a final divorce with Russia. 

You mentioned that many Russian-speaking Ukrainians were switching to Ukrainian. Will this be a lasting trend, or will everything go back to the old ways once the war is over? 

I am a historian, I study the past. It’s difficult for me to forecast what will happen in the future. Linguistic assimilation is a very long and slow process, taking an average of three generations. I don’t know if in terms of speaking Ukrainian we should categorize today’s young generation as the first or second. But I believe we are dealing with a steady trend. 

Of course, Ukraine and Ukrainians have been linked to Russia by various ties: political, cultural and personal. But that bond is about to end. There will be a final divorce with Russia. 

Do Ukrainians relate to President Volodymyr Zelensky with equal enthusiasm as in the West one year after the new phase of the war? 

I have not seen any sociological studies on Volodymyr Zelensky’s standing in the West, but I am very familiar with various surveys on his perception in Ukraine. They show that until the outbreak of the war the President was not very popular. Then the situation changed dramatically. Currently, Zelensky enjoys great trust among Ukrainians. Moreover, for the first time in more than 30 years, most of my compatriots have begun to trust the state. This is a great change. Certainly, one of the factors behind it is that in times of war the nation unites around the state authorities and institutions. However, this attitude of Ukrainians was and is influenced by Zelensky’s behaviour, especially during the first three days of Russian aggression. The current Zelensky is a completely different Zelensky than before the war. He can be described as Zelensky 2.0. The next question is what will happen to him after the war. We don’t know if he will be a good peacetime President or just a wartime one. We will see what Zelensky 3.0 will be like. In my opinion, he will ascend the national pantheon, alongside Taras Shevchenko and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. 

 The current Zelensky is a completely different Zelensky than before the war. He can be described as Zelensky 2.0. The next question is what will happen to him after the war.

Does the opposition still support the current government in the face of Russian aggression?

There is a generational change in Ukrainian politics. All the people around Zelensky are in their forties. They are the ones who will set the tone of Ukrainian politics in the coming years. In such an environment, both Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko look like political dinosaurs. They have no chance of returning to power. Equally important is the fact that the pro-Russian opposition, the groupings that followed the breakup of Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, has completely vanished. Many of its members fled to Russia or the West after February 24. A gap appeared in this part of the political scene. Poroshenko’s situation is very complicated. It is not so much Poroshenko attacking Zelensky, but Zelensky attacking Poroshenko, or more precisely his entourage. 

With the war over, a danger of being tempted to a new authoritarianism may appear for Ukraine. It will certainly not be a copy of the Yanukovych, Lukashenko or Putin governments. However, Ukraine may return to its old ways.

Sometimes you can hear people saying that Kyiv may win the war and lose the peace. The key issue is whether a new political party will emerge that will not so much compete with the Servant of the Nation (Zelensky), but bring some balance to the political scene to prevent a possible return of authoritarianism. 

How do you assess the prospect of accession to the European Union? Will Kyiv’s integration path be shortened? 

For the past 20 years, Ukraine had been seeking a European perspective, but never received a positive response. It only took two months of war for Brussels to give the green light. War always works that way: it makes previously impossible things possible. 

What is crucial is that Ukraine will receive Marshall Plan-like aid. I hope it will not just be an economic plan, but also a political one. It is about putting pressure on the authorities in Kyiv to carry out the necessary reforms.

The Ukrainians are pragmatists and realize that this process will not be easy. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the cost of rebuilding the country. A sizable number of young people who went abroad will not return to Ukraine. Time works against us. If the war continues for many years, most of them will tie their future to other countries. However, if the West allocates substantial resources, many young Ukrainians will return to their home country to help rebuild it. Their asset will be the social capital accumulated in Western countries. They will be able to act as a link between the West and Ukraine. I see this in my students. Those who seek only a comfortable life will stay in the West. The ambitious ones are returning or planning to return. It will be a chance for them to advance socially and politically. 

Yaroslav Hrytsak, Ukrainian Historian and Professor at the Ukrainian Catholic University, Aspen Institute Kyiv Supervisory Board Member