Central and Eastern Europe and the Czech Republic in a Chinese Mirror

In May 1996, Miloš Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), said in a press interview that his primary motivation in political activity was to counter those who, to please the Chinese, would, the very next day after their appearance in the Czech Republic, undergo plastic surgery on their eyes, contract jaundice and claim that they have loved to eat rice since birth. In 2014, already “after the appearance of the Chinese,” Zeman, now the Czech President, visited China and announced to his hosts that he had come to learn how to increase economic growth and “stabilize society”, not to teach about a market economy or human rights.

In my book, “Relacyjność w stosunkach Chin z Europą Środkowo-Wschodnią. Przypadek Czech” (Relationality in China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of the Czech Republic; University of Lodz Press, 2024), I explore the fundamental shift in the Czech Republic’s approach to China after 2012 of which former President Miloš Zeman was the symbol and chief advocate. Fueled by the intertwining of business and politics, the rise and fall of the Czech-China relationship is examined in the broader context of China’s political and economic goals: towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as well as the European Union (EU) and even the United States (US). The book adopts a relational perspective, owing to China’s perceived similarities with CEE based on shared (post)socialist experiences and identification with a politically defined Global South.

Protecting the Security of the CCP regime

The strategic importance of CEE was recognized by China at the beginning of the 21st century, especially in connection with the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004. The turning point, however, was the global economic crisis of 2008, which strengthened the motivation to develop relations on both the Eastern European and Chinese sides. These expectations were aroused by China when, in 2012, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao inaugurated the multilateral format of 16+1 (now 14+1) in Warsaw, promising Chinese investments, credit lines and trade opportunities.

 On the wave of enthusiasm caused by the economic promises, the Chinese authorities accumulated considerable political capital among the CEE countries. It allowed Beijing to develop a relational approach at the (initially) annual summits of heads of state and prime ministers of the 16+1 format. At the same time, it incited the interest of CEE political elites in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the Chinese side quickly recognized as complementary to the 16+1.

Chinese promises have also fallen on fertile ground in the Czech Republic. In 2016, at a welcome dinner for Chairman Xi Jinping in Prague, President Zeman assured that “the Czech Republic wants to be China’s gateway to the EU.” On another occasion, he rolled out a vision of the Czech Republic as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier for Chinese investment in Europe”. Beijing, on the other hand, presented itself as an opportunity for a developmental leap for the Czech Republic. Enthusiasm and expectations for cooperation were thus evident at both ends of the relational arrangement. However, the goals set by both sides – as it was to turn out –  were understood differently. A few years on, it became apparent that the Chinese economic offer was not suitable for the legal architecture of the EU. The financial mechanisms offered by China to developing countries (state guarantees, no bidding procedures, use of Chinese labor and construction materials) were attractive mainly to non-EU Western Balkan countries.

In exchange for investment and business opportunities, China expected CEE countries to support or at least stay neutral on China’s human rights records and respect China’s core interests (hexin liyi) with regard to Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, the South China Sea, as well as lifting the EU embargo on arms sales.

The concept of core interests includes (1) maintenance of the socialist system and the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China’s political system, (2) protection of national unity, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and (3) stable economic and social development. The latter two elements are thus clearly subordinate to the first – ensuring the security of the CCP regime.

Central and Eastern Europe as Part of China’s Global South Imagined Community

A key factor shaping China’s approach to CEE was its assignment to the set of developing countries.

Although the CEE countries have relatively little potential for China as an economic partner, due to the perceived weakness of their rule of law and the exogenous nature of democracy, they were considered susceptible to pursuing relational politics and building support for China’s political agenda.

The roots of this perception go back to the late 19th century when Eastern Europe was ‘orientalized’ by Chinese political thinkers. The construction of an image of the region as an eastern, i.e. less politically, economically and culturally advanced part of Europe, was largely a result of reproducing the region’s representations from Western European Renaissance historiography. At the end of the Qing empire, Chinese intellectuals used the orientalized version of Eastern Europe, including the history of Poland’s partition, to understand their country’s situation, which was dominated by foreign powers. This image has largely survived to this day, shaping the political and economic mechanisms used by China in its relational policies toward CEE, at both bilateral and multilateral levels.

Both during the Cold War and now, CEE is perceived in China as an “intermediate zone”, an object rather than a subject of international politics: a tool for manipulating relational circles and balancing other powers (first the Soviet Union, now the West). The post-1989 transformation of CEE is seen in China as a process imposed by the West, not a result of its genuine aspirations and independent decisions. In other words, the region’s alleged lack of democratic traditions and weakness of the rule of law makes it a suitable partner for relational politics.

The relational approach that characterizes Chinese policy toward developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has also been reflected in the institutionalization of the 16+1 format. This platform, used by Beijing as a tool of “heads of state diplomacy” (shounao waijiao) at the multilateral level, served mainly to network relations with the ruling elites in CEE and create a political umbrella for developing a bilateral set of strategic partnerships. It was also part of balancing the key Western European states and the European Union itself. Other functions of the format, including economic ones, were of secondary importance to China.

The Czech Republic as a Target of China’s Relational Politics

The case of the Czech Republic is particularly revealing because, until the beginning of the 2010s, it pursued a value-based policy towards China, openly challenging its core interests.

The relational restart in Czech-Chinese relations, almost parallel to the emergence of the 16+1 format, began on the grounds of the economization of Czech foreign policy and opening to the East. This is linked to the rise to power in the Czech Republic of the ‘pragmatist’ camp, most notably Miloš Zeman, who, from the beginning of his presidency, clearly emphasized a departure from the political line of the values-based policy outlined by the late President Václav Havel.

Over the two decades since the fall of communism, it was the Czech Republic’s continued support for Chinese dissidents and Tibet and Taiwan’s independence that was seen by the ‘pragmatist’ as the main political obstacle, limiting economic benefits, real or illusioned, in cooperation with China.

This shift was underpinned by narratives that sought to create a shared relational identity based on the contestation of liberal democracy and China’s elite-capture in the Czech Republic.

As meticulously demonstrated by the Prague-based Sinopsis think tank, the change in Czech foreign policy toward China was stimulated by the late richest Czech, Petr Kellner (who died in 2021), whose financial conglomerate PPF (Home Credit) in the early 2010s became the driving force and main beneficiary of the warming in Czech-Chinese relations. Thanks to the improved political atmosphere and Home Credit’s entry into the Chinese market, the Czech Republic opened up to the nominally private conglomerate CEFC, whose head, Ye Jianming, became President Zeman’s economic advisor. The story of CEFC, however, which justified its operations in the Czech Republic not only on economic grounds but also promoting friendly interstate relations, ended amid scandal and suspicions of corruption, and Ye’s disappearance with his arrest in China in 2018.

The Czech Republic responded positively to China’s expectations of supporting its core political objectives, hoping that these political concessions would translate into a marked increase in Chinese economic involvement in the Czech Republic and easier access to the Chinese market.

This resulted in a clear axiological shift of Czech ruling elites, who largely distanced themselves from the Dalai Lama’s visit to Prague in October 2016. The reaction of Czech authorities demonstrates a broader pattern in China’s strategy of cultivating relations with foreign ruling elites and shaping those reactions through elite capture and economic blackmail.

Another example of relational influencing was reflected in the dichotomous reaction of the Czech ruling elite to the security warning against Huawei in late 2018, issued by Czech cyberservices amid a US-induced global backlash against the Chinese tech giant. The concerns expressed by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, who got into a dispute with the Chinese ambassador Zhang Jianmin over this issue, contrasted with President Miloš Zeman’s public reactions. In line with his relational obligations to the PRC, Zeman disavowed the risks not only in the domestic media but also at the international level, i.e. at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.

The most notable illustration of relational logic was the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty in the city partnership between Prague and Beijing. In 2016, a provision on Taiwan’s inseparability from China was inserted in the local cooperation agreement between the two capitals. Including the controversial clause, however, not only failed to increase the expected Chinese investment in Prague but, more importantly, ultimately led to the termination of the agreement by Zdeněk Hřib (Pirate Party), who became Prague’s mayor in late 2018.

Last but not least, relational policing was exemplified by China’s “mask diplomacy” during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, aimed at legitimizing the CCP’s systemic rivalry with liberal democracies.

Medical aid delivered to foreign countries was intended to protect the security of the Chinese regime by covering up its botched response to the pandemic outbreak and changing global perceptions of China as the solution, not the cause, of the global crisis.

To this end, China was ‘encouraging’ senior officials of countries receiving medical supplies to participate in “gratitude ceremonies”. In the case of the Czech Republic, China’s manipulation translated into the Czechs’ (false) belief that China, not the European Union, was the key source of medical aid.

Lessons from the Relational Decade

Following the Czech Republic’s disappointment with the results of the economization of its foreign policy toward China and, above all, the disruption of major relational ties with the end of Miloš Zeman’s presidency in 2023, which was preceded by the death of Petr Kellner and the arrest of Ye Jianming, a relational decade in Czech-Chinese relations has come to a close. The process of returning to a value-based policy has matured in the Czech Republic over the past few years. Steps initiated at the local and parliamentary levels (Senate President Miloš Vystrčil’s visit to Taiwan) were solidified by the policies of Prime Minister Petr Fiala and President Petr Pavel.

The story of the Sino-Czech relational decade contributes to discussions on China’s foreign policy instruments and its way of thinking about international relations.

According to the logic of relational ties, the subsequent turnaround that has taken place in Sino-Czech relations is primarily a derivative of the strong personalisation of relations, favoring informality and trust-based interpersonal relationships over the rule of law. For this reason, relationality sometimes finds fertile ground in Central and Eastern Europe. The sustainability of the Chinese approach is limited, however, by the scale of the economic benefits offered by China in exchange for political concessions and, above all, the strength of the defense mechanisms embedded in liberal democracies.