Neither David nor Goliath: Perspectives on the Ukraine Defense

During the winter and early spring of 2024, the situation remained difficult for the Ukrainian defenders. The exhaustion of an earlier aid package from the United States, which was and is Ukraine’s key support country, meant that the Ukrainian armed forces had to significantly reduce their daily use of artillery ammunition. In April, after several months of discussions, Congress finally voted on a new aid program worth 61 billion dollars. This made it clear once again that Ukraine is completely dependent on military, financial and humanitarian support from the West. Without it, the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces would only be a matter of time.

Unlikely major Russian breakthrough

Recent months have shown that the Ukrainian defence remains effective despite many problems and difficulties. Russia has seized the initiative and advanced a few dozen kilometers on some sections of the front, but without spectacular successes in the form of the capture of major cities or strategically important locations. The biggest Ukrainian problems have been and still are the fatigue of the soldiers, the lack of sufficient new recruits and the fact that the Ukrainians still have less Western weapons and ammunition than they need. Combined with the strengthening of Ukrainian defensive lines, it is therefore unlikely that the Russians will occupy significant new territory in the near future. The front line is likely to remain relatively stable.

This is the reason why Russia has tried to achieve a breakthrough in recent months by systematically firing missiles at Ukraine’s energy infrastructure – unfortunately with numerous successes. It is estimated that the aggressor managed to destroy almost half of Ukraine’s energy production capacity. With winter approaching, this generates huge challenges for Ukrainian society. Regular Russian attacks on civilian facilities and numerous atrocities are not so much undermining Ukraine’s will to defend itself, but rather fueling hatred of Russia and the belief that this is an existential war for Ukraine.

The self-limitations of the West

The West is helping, but it is also a limiting and inhibiting factor in some of Ukrainians’ military actions. This is because they do not have full freedom to use selected Western weapons, including ATACMS and long-range missiles. In practice, this means that Ukrainian forces cannot fire them at targets on Russian territory.

This is particularly relevant in the context of one of Kyiv’s most important objectives, the destruction of the Crimean Bridge. It is a key supply route for Russian troops operating in Crimea and other occupied territories. Ukraine’s repeated regular attacks on Russian refineries, which dealt a painful blow to the oil sector and led to a 8-14% drop in production, has been met with displeasure by the US and some other Western countries.

The Kremlin is aware of the restrictions imposed on Ukraine by the West and is in a position to play them effectively.

Russia understands that its most effective instrument for influencing Western elites and societies is the persistent fear of an escalating war and a nuclear scenario.

Therefore, Russian politicians and Russian propaganda are playing on these emotions, which is proving to be quite effective. The recent telephone conversation between the Russian and US defense ministers, the first in more than a dozen months, served, among other things, to put pressure on Washington to ‘discipline’ the Ukrainians.

Not enough to win

The West is trying to keep the war under control and prevent it from escalating beyond Ukraine’s borders. It should also be acknowledged that the option of Moscow using nuclear weapons remains unlikely, but cannot be entirely ruled out. Crossing a red line would entail risks, including in terms of the world’s reaction, also from countries that currently de facto favor Russia (e.g. China) or wish to maintain neutral relations with it (Turkey and India, among others). Moreover, even if the Kremlin were to break the nuclear taboo, this would not guarantee victory.

The Kremlin retains the nuclear card and pulls it from time to time, but essentially relies on self-restraint, fears, mistakes and Western fatigue to eventually give Russia victory. Ukraine is currently receiving enough military equipment and ammunition to hold the front line, but this is still too little for the Ukrainian forces to think about a counter-offensive. Even the first ten F-16 fighter jets delivered by Denmark and the Netherlands at the end of July, with a further ten announced by the end of this year and 29 by 2025, are still too few to achieve a breakthrough.

Ukraine strikes back

The Ukrainians are aware of the stalemate on the frontline, their growing problems and a possible political U-turn by the West. They are therefore looking for an opportunity to take Russia by surprise with non-standard actions.

These include the aforementioned attacks on Russian refineries or the increasing use of long-range drones. The Ukrainian actions confirm the words of the then Ukrainian commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, who said in an interview with The Economist last year that “In order for us to break this deadlock [on the front] we need something new”. This approach is shared by his successor, General Olexandr Syrsky, who took the decision to launch an incursion into the Russian region of Kursk at the beginning of August.

The penetration of around two thousand Ukrainian troops into Russian territory without any significant Russian resistance, the capture of several hundred square kilometers and the detention there for several days revealed Russian weaknesses. The aim of this unprecedented operation appears to be to force the Russians to redeploy some units from the front and thus relieve the sections of the front where the Ukrainians are having the most problems (at the time of writing, the Ukrainian operation is still ongoing).

Kyiv also wanted to demonstrate to the West that it is a mistake to condemn it to defeat in this war and that the Ukrainian armed forces are capable of innovating and conducting such smart operations.

The Kremlin’s surprising decision-making paralysis became clear. Indeed, for several days the Russians were unable to oust professionally operating Ukrainian units, resulting in significant reputational damage for the Russian authorities.

The maximalism of Moscow and Kyiv

Kyiv and Moscow naturally envision the end of the war very differently. Ukraine expects, among other things, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all its territories, the punishment of those guilty of crimes and the payment of reparations. This maximalist Ukrainian plan is expressed in Volodymyr Zelensky’s 10-point peace formula, presented in November 2022.

Although it is still officially propagated by Kyiv, it is clear that its implementation is unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Ukrainian public is also aware of this. Opinion polls show that within a year, the number of Ukrainians who would be prepared to cede part of Ukrainian territory to Russia in exchange for peace has risen from 10% to 32%. At the same time, the number of those who completely reject concessions to Russia has fallen from 84% to 55%.

The Russian objectives can be divided into tactical and strategic ones. The former consist primarily of forcing Kyiv to recognise territorial annexations, including the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions that are still under its control and which were incorporated into Russia under Russian law in 2022. Moscow also expects the neutral status of Ukraine, its demilitarization and a change of power in Kyiv.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, however, the aim of this war is not to grab new territory. This should be emphasized, as there is still a widespread belief that Ukrainian territorial concessions could end the war. They cannot, because Russia is not interested in gaining control over this or that county.

Russian expectations are also maximalist.

Moscow’s strategic goal is to take control of Ukraine and bring about the collapse of Ukrainian statehood, even if this means a long war of attrition.

This, in turn, is only the prelude to imposing on the West a thorough revision of the post-Cold War security system in this part of the world and ensuring Russia’s return to its role as a major player. In doing so, the Putin regime is counting on its ally to achieve these goals as the crisis in the Western world progresses.

The political dynamics of the West

The Russian authorities see their chances of victory in a possible revision of the attitude of important Western countries towards the war and further support for Ukraine. This would happen primarily through a political change in the United States. Moscow is waiting for the election of Donald Trump, not so much because it expects a revolutionary change in US policy under his leadership.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, the best-case scenario would be a deep and protracted internal conflict, which would result in the US having to deal with itself and at least limit its ability to act in Europe and globally – Moscow has an ally in Beijing for this.

Russia has only limited means at its disposal to achieve this. However, its actions are aimed at sowing chaos in the Western world, supporting anti-system political forces and increasing social polarization, including through numerous disinformation campaigns. The Kremlin’s overall goal remains to weaken the West so that, under the influence of its own problems, it is no longer able to confront Russia and is forced to revise its policy of support for Ukraine. All of this according to the logic: the worse for them, the better for us.

Is a similar scenario impossible? The answer must be: it depends. The word that perhaps best describes the international reality today is uncertainty. This applies first and foremost to the policies of the post-Biden US administration, both towards the war and the world in general. Therefore, change will be inevitable, regardless of whether Trump or Kamala Harris is the next president. Both Russia, which sees this as an opportunity for itself, and Kyiv, which hopes that US support will not wane, are waiting for the US political settlement. Ukraine’s announcement that it will present a new peace plan by the end of November should be seen in this context. It is clear that its content will depend on the outcome of these elections.

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The practice of two and a half years of war shows that Ukraine is neither a David nor Russia a Goliath. The Ukrainians are defending themselves bravely, even though they have been condemned to defeat. They are too weak, however, and Western help is not yet enough to win the war. The Russians, on the other hand, should have been predestined for a quick victory, as they theoretically had all the advantages on their side. It turned out that Ukraine has proven to be a worthy opponent.

Hence, analogies based on history, and even more so on ancient myths, are often unreliable. Every war is subject to its own laws and has its own dynamics. The outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and thus the clash between Russia and the West is still uncertain. What is clear is that the most important Western capitals have lacked the vision and strategic courage to resolve the ongoing war in favor of Ukraine and thus the democratic world. It is not only the future of the Ukrainian state that is at stake in this conflict, but also the credibility and security of its Western allies.