Scholz’s Politics are Lacking in Consideration for Europe as a Whole

To what degree has the war in Ukraine changed Germany’s approach to foreign diplomacy?

I think it has drastically changed its view on security. Germans have suddenly realized that there is an open war taking place on the borders of Europe and that it poses a direct threat. The ones most in the know are the political elites, who quickly grasped that dependency on Russian gas is Germany’s greatest weakness and poses a massive risk. To their own chagrin, they massively underestimated what we in Central Europe already knew, that Putin would, in a critical moment, use this as a way to apply pressure.

Within the first year of the war, the German government managed, in record time, the complete redirection of its gas supply from the Russian pipelines to procuring natural gas from new suppliers overseas in the form of LNG. Much more complicated was how its own society’s views evolved, with its established pacifist tradition, on the war in Ukraine and on what Germany can do about it. This had its own temporal, psychological and political dynamics. When Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave his famous “Zeitenwende” speech, he received a round of applause. However, as quick as Germany was in changing its gas supply, it has been much slower in changing its defense and strategic considerations. There is a level of contradiction to this: on the one hand the war in Ukraine is happening awfully close to Germany, with which comes the conviction throughout all the centrist parties that this will dictate the future of the European block and with that even Germany’s role in it. On the other hand, there is a prevailing notion that so far this is not primarily a war against Germany, and thus it is not regarded as such an existential threat. German society, exhausted by the covid-19 pandemic, by high energy prices and by the modernization of the current government, has therefore been unwilling to accept more changes, unless they are demanded by circumstances.

How much has Germany’s hesitation been influenced by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s own political style, which tends to be denoted as cautious?

I would say it is more so due to existing structural factors rather than to Scholz’s character alone. Firstly, the “ Traffic Light” Coalition (“Ampelkoalition”) had been working together for only a few months when the war broke out. What brought these three different parties together were their policies on internal reforms in Germany, namely in the areas of digitalization, climate and social policies, or the liberalization of Germany’s  citizenship laws; all of these were domestic issues upon which consensus was possible. It has become apparent that due to the war in Ukraine and the new challenges it has brought, the government, which is the first ever coalition comprising three partners, began to falter. It also soon became clear that they have not agreed upon or have even had clearly unified objectives for foreign policy or for matters of security. Therefore, it is all being done on the fly. This has been a difficult test for them right from the start.

This also applied to the Chancellor himself, who had no experience with foreign policy, having previously been the Minister of Finance. It turned out that they were caught in the tide of events. Initially, Scholz had it set up so that his government would coordinate all important matters with Washington, more so than with, for example, Paris or his other European partners. He set some limits to his escalation and rather than setting a  red line against Russia he was more bothered by the possibility that the conflict might escalate into a larger war with the entire West. Scholz adopted into his own belief the fact that Russia sees the war with Ukraine as exactly that. This is one aspect of the situation.

For his party, the Social Democrats (SPD), this was a very difficult shift, since in the past, they were proponents of rapprochement with Russia through mutual trade (“Wandel Durch Handel”), with the Nord Stream gas pipeline projectalso viewed as part of that. SPD took the changes relatively in stride, without overly excessive soul-searching in the process, and distanced itself from Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, later a lobbyist for Gazprom. Manuela Schwesig, the Minister President of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, who had initially supported the completion of the pipeline, remained in office and soon began to take a very pragmatic approach to helping Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Chancellor came under pressure within the government from the Green Party, whose leaders, with Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Minister for Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock at the helm, became somewhat hawkish in their approach to the war in Ukraine and to Russia, as well as to China.

The other issue that also needs to be addressed is the budgetary and economic side of it all. The solution, which came immediately after the war, namely the creation of a new off-budget fund of 100 billion euros, changed governmental priorities. Until the constitutional court’s decision in the Fall of 2023, Scholz and his two coalition partners turned out to have found a trick to achieve their priorities, for example with the Green Party’s agenda on fighting climate change, so that the other governing party, the liberal FDP, could claim that the constitutionally guaranteed debt brake would remain in effect. The solution was a special fund for climate change (KTF), into which the money would be placed. The constitutional court put an end, however, to any such schemes, and today Germany has found itself in a dilemma, where they need to save money wherever they can and are unsure of how to build a budget for 2025, which is missing more than 30 billion euros. At the same time, there is already an agreement in place, that the costs associated with the defense and support of Ukraine are going to be exempt from it.

Scholz’s government also faces a drastic drop in public support, which is currently hovering under 20%. So, when you look at it from a broader perspective, it is hard to tell what Germany, under so much domestic pressure, can actually do.

And when it comes to armaments and strategy? What are Scholz’s options?

There is an apparent major clash with the French approach: Paris would like an autonomous European solution, independent of the United States, with the French military industry playing a key role. Scholz, on the other hand, presented an initiative for a European defensive shield, SkyShield, where he wants to buy what is on the market, in other words either Israeli or American systems. In that sense, Germany is forging its own path now, while there is also a noticeable nervousness around the results of the American presidential elections and the possible return of Donald Trump into the White House. Apparently, however, not even this eventuality would make Scholz’s government lean away from the Americans and towards wider European defensive autonomy; again he would rather adapt to this new situation.

This is important, since in this regard the current government can build rapport with Poland or Northeast Europe. At the same time, it is also Scholz’s SPD that has not yet completely closed its  doors to potential future negotiations with Russia. On the one hand, there is a prevailing panic of “how did we get here,” and the need to strengthen European defenses against Russia as much as possible. On the other hand, there is still this thin illusion that we will need to co-exist with Russia, as we are more vulnerable to a variety of hybrid incidents that have been happening –  and which will significantly test the resilience of our societies and our entire democratic system. And this wave of accumulated discontent, frustration and aggression is simultaneously strengthening the far-right and far-left parties, supported from Moscow.

In summary, I still see only a limited ability on the part of German political leaders, with the exception of a fraction of the Green Party and CDU, to lead public debate contributing systematically to a change in the public mindset and to openly declare what all of this could lead to.

This would fundamentally shake German society out of its comfort zone and out of a certain type of complacency which it finds itself in.

Part of the aforementioned comfort zone is that the entire German economic model is stretched and not working as it should. Germans still have their industrial structure built on sectors from the twentieth century, whether it is the chemical or automotive industry. They have to change their entire economic model, and this change will hurt. In the long-term view, it makes them uncompetitive due to the high energy costs of the economy. This requires major changes, which will lead to upheaval, and which the aging population does not want to even consider, as it is nervous about the uncertainty – and that plays right into the hands of anti-system parties like AfD, or Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht.

On top of that, we do not even know what solutions CDU would come up with, were they to win the 2025 election with old guard politician Friedrich Merz at the helm. Germany is focused inward to a significant degree, consumed by its internal crises and does not seem too interested in leading or even setting itself as an example for the rest of Europe. This reflects the expectations of the German voters, who primarily expect solutions which will improve the quality of life at home, and only after would they consider giving the rest of Europe a hand.

Has Germany’s view changed over the last two years on Central Europe? Have they perhaps stopped perceiving us as a homogeneous whole and as troublemakers?

Yes, Germany has recognized the differences among the countries of Central Europe, but also its own responsibility for this region. Despite that, society and its politics still find themselves in this somewhat complacent zone stemming from the United States underwriting safety guarantees, upon which everything is built.

Could Germany’s view of our region have changed to such a degree that Germany might start seeing it as a source of potential allies?

But that is already happening. Today’s political elite, obviously apart from AfD or the far left, considers the Baltic region as part of their own security. As partners in the European Union and allies within NATO, they cannot be left at the mercy of revisionist Russia. On top of that, our region is now an inseparable part of the unified European market, and were it to fall apart, the German economy would also collapse in on itself.

What I think we’re underestimating, however, is that modern Germany is still predominantly a trading superpower, which is very dependent on the global economy and its rules. It acts more on the principles of trade rather than strategy, although this is gradually changing.

But I would also like to highlight another issue, that our societies, in terms of political engagement, are not only not getting closer to one another, but might even be diverging from each other, and this concerning the question of climate change and the decarbonization of the economy. We in Central Europe are lagging behind, despite our economies having a very large share of industry and emissions, meaning that lowering our carbon footprint will have to be very carefully managed, in order to avoid deindustrialization and loss of competitiveness. These rules are being set on the level of a single market, thus in Brussels, where we are not an adequate player for Germany. Our governments have slightly underestimated this, in the case of Prague we actually actively opposed it. In short, we are too narrowly focused on European sectoral policies, and we’re not an interesting partner for Germany in  other agendas. There they have the French, Dutch, and Southern European members of the EU for that.

So the fact that our industry is set up in a similar manner as Germany’s, does not give us an advantage and does not present a potential source of cooperation?

It seems to me that we are probably not capable of seizing on it all that well. The war in Ukraine has shifted the gears of European politics so that security and geopolitics are at the forefront. In this respect, Poland has played an important role, and can significantly influence the setting of European security policies within the framework of the new Commission. A great deal will be invested into the revival of the defense industries. But then again, industrial policies as a whole are a different ball game.

Within the last two years, it has become clear that our position in terms of supply chains is pushing us a little back towards our old role. We are not sitting at the table when new rules and regulations are being set, but in fact are merelyrule takers. Look at the current dispute with China over tariffs on imported electric cars: Berlin doesn’t ask about  the opinion of Prague or Bratislava, firstly because we do not really have an opinion on it, and secondly because the relevant car companies that are present on our markets are managed from Germany.

In your opinion, how should German-Polish relations be regarded in light of the change in Polish leadership?

That has changed, and there was a great sense of relief in Germany when at the end of 2023 the eight year reign of Law and Justice (PiS) came to an end, having lost the elections. For the entirety of those eight years, Germany was doing its best to carry out “damage control”, minimizing harm, which meant a very operative policy. Even after the start of the war, there were still echoes out of Jarosław Kaczyński’s camp full of mistrust of Germany. I will remind you of the incident when Russian invasion rockets fell on Polish territory, and Germans offered their Patriot air defense system. The Polish government hesitated in accepting it. They are fully aware in Berlin that the new Polish government and Premier Donald Tusk was under enormous pressure and that during his campaign he was labeled as a German agent. So here it’s more a matter of waiting for when he himself will determine to what degree he wants to develop some bilateral initiatives.

Today’s Germany also does not want to deal with questions of the past and feels that it has done enough for reconciliation. They do not realize that in regards to Poland they did not quite hit the mark.

Symbolic topics like reparations are something that not even Tusk’s government will be able to take completely off the table. And it is possible that Tusk will not want to take risks before the presidential elections in May of 2025 and that he will wait for the new German federal government under the leadership of CDU, which belongs to the same political family within the European Parliament.

For now it is being replaced by the Weimar Triangle, whose members are Poland, Germany, and also France. I think that a major turning point will be Poland’s EU presidency in the first half of 2025, where direct Warsaw-Berlin dialogue will be unavoidable, specifically in the last phase before the presidency itself and also when positions in the new European institutions are being allocated.

I noticed that Tusk went to Berlin for the Weimar Triangle debate, and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski seems to also prefer this format over direct bilateral negotiations with Germany. And the Germans, in turn, are urging the French that key decisions regarding European security and policy must now be made in coordination with Poland.

So achieving the near ideal state of Polish-German relations, which was prevailing in the pre-2015 election of PiS, is unlikely?

No, it is really not possible. I will explain it with another example, and that is specifically about how the restart of the German armaments  industry is taking shape. They are aware that the massive 100 billion euro fund has to be used for the rearming of the military, since that’s where they have built a massive deficit, as for decades they have not paid the Bundeswehr much attention. Obviously though, once they kickstart the arms industry,  they will have larger production, which will exceed the needs of their own military, and will be able to be the basis for the rearming of other allies.

There was a great deal of expectation there from Poland, to whom territorial defense of the Eastern wing of NATO is vitally important. The previous government was betting on agreements with the Americans and South Korea. Now we can expect some form of flagship project, a unified effort and also that the Polish government will not find itself in hot water were it to rearm with German weaponry. As another example, Bundeswehr is currently building up its military presence in Lithuania, where in order to strengthen the security of its eastern border it is planning on establishing a full brigade. For now, it is unimaginable that Poland will not have an issue with Bundeswehr troops on its territory,  when it comes to defending NATO’s eastern borders. In order to do so, there is the need for a comprehensive partnership from both sides, and a new Polish-German understanding – that will only  be possible with the new German government led by the Christian Democrats (CDU), which ideologically aligns more with Warsaw and Tusk’s government.

Have you noticed any vast differences or parallels between the foreign policies of Scholz and his predecessor Angel Merkel?

Foremost, it has to be said that Scholz does not do European politics. It is generally believed that he is not someone who stimulates decisions and mediates compromises within the European Council. At the end of her era, Angela Merkel was the clear leader of the European Council and was seen as more than just within the context of the German presidency. Whenever a problem arose, there was the expectation that she would step in for the somewhat weak president of the European Council, Charles Michel. After her departure, it became clear that the European Council was lacking in leadership. Russia’s President Putin had to have counted on this, with the timing of his invasion of Ukraine after her departure. Scholz is a different type of leader, who also has a different approach to the concerns arising from this conflict.

What is Berlin’s view on the recent developments in Slovakia?

Before the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico, there was a general belief that Fico is manageable, that in reality he is more pragmatic than he presents himself in public. A large part of his radicalisms and pro-Russian stances were in line with public statements meant to maintain support of certain groups of voters who are being competed for by the far-right. Olaf Scholz, when he had Fico over in Berlin for a visit at the end of January, personally commended the fact that Fico, unlike Orbán, did not block any European decision regarding Ukraine. Quite the opposite, Fico was attempting to push for even more intense bilateral cooperation with Kyiv, as demonstrated by two joint sessions with the Ukrainian government in the last six months. Simultaneously, Slovakia offered Germany several interesting projects in the arms industry. Minister of Defence Robert Kaliňák is working together with the Czech arms group led by Michal Strnad, and is quietly preparing a project for the production of ammunition for Ukraine within close distance of its borders, to be finished by the end of the year.

Chancellor Scholz is basically set up in such a way that he can address issues operationally. Slovakia is going to be a less important partner, but not as big a problem as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

It surprises me that in Berlin they look at Slovakia in such a different light from Prague, that essentially, reasonable communication with Fico is possible. The Germans clearly see that Slovakia, unlike Hungary, is cutting itself off from Russian oil and energy, even from their nuclear fuel supplies, so structurally it works.

In addition to all that, Slovakia is in the Eurozone, and I believe that both prime ministers agreed at their meeting that one of the biggest vulnerabilities for Fico’s government are the financial markets. This implies the need to consolidate the economy and a dependency on the flow of European money from the Recovery Fund. Fico announced the consolidation of public funds up to one percent of the GDP annually, which is an insane pace. If his government is to manage even half of that, it will need pragmatic cooperation with Berlin. Unlike Orbán, Fico has no reason to begin a confrontation with Brussels or the West, even if verbally he is opposed to them.

The other thing is the party politics aspect. SPD used to be partners with Fico’s party Smer. Two years ago, when Fico put himself at the front of Anti-Vaccine demonstrations, SPD distanced themselves from Fico and moved to support Pellegrini’s Hlas instead as some sort of modern social democracy. There has been a decision made that both parties will have their European Socialists memberships suspended, but their MPs will be in the new European Parliament, and I think that the partners within this faction will only then decide what will be done with the Slovak representatives. It is also uncertain because the European socialists do not have all that many MPs in the European Parliament to begin with, or prime ministers within the European Council.

Can we somehow predict how things will play out after the assassination attempt on Fico?

He will have more sympathy from the public, but a great deal will depend on the concrete steps his government takes and on the political direction he himself chooses after his return to office. Until then, a lot will be revealed by the decision of the socialist faction in the European Parliament, which is expected at the end of June and beginning of July, and what stance SPD will take towards it. I would say that far more than worrying about Fico, the German government is concerned with the growing influence of misinformation and of pro-Russian narratives in Slovakia and the long-term resilience of society.