„Decolonized Russia”? Be careful what you wish for

I don’t see any realistic prospects for Russia disintegration/decolonization nor any genuine wish among peoples living in Russian Federation to participate in such a scenario. To put it simply, you cannot decolonize people who do not want to be decolonized! – says Marlene Laruelle in an interview with Jakub Dymek

Jakub Dymek: Since Russia’s War against Ukraine broke out in full force on 24th February last year, there’s been a lot of talk about it eventually resulting not only in a possible military defeat of Russia, but also a collapse of Russian state and fragmentation of it’s territory. You argue that the western proponents of so called „decolonisation” of Russia are wrong. Why is that?

Marlene Laruelle: Let’s start with saying that there’s even no agreement of what the term “decolonisation” means. And while there is a lot of academic discussion about colonial theory and colonial aspects of Russian history, these academic approaches are often conflated with political discussion about Russia’s possible disintegration as a result of military or political defeat of Putin. And while I’m appreciative of these academic or theoretical discussions, at the same time I want to say to those who think that Russia’s collapse will be the answer to all of our today’s problems that they’re wrong. So maybe let’s start with decolonize our view of Russia and focus on real issues here: centralization and decentralization, attitudes in so called „ethnic republics” of Russia, situation in Central Asia and more broadly in the region. It is sometimes difficult in the realities of US discourse where the efforts of diagnosing the situation are mixed with strong policy positions on Russia and kind of wishful thinking: that we need to punish Russia, how Russia’s collapse is desirable, is this the long-postoned final chapter in the history of Soviet Empire and so on… 

So let’s begin with your thoughts on the latter. 

I don’t see any realistic prospects for Russia disintegration/decolonization nor any genuine wish among peoples living in Russian Federation to participate in such a scenario. To the contrary: memories of Soviet Union collapse are still quite strong as well as the trauma of the 90s. What unites different groups of Russian society and members of ethnic minorities among them as well is a sense of common fate and belonging [in this country]. You can argue that we do not really know how many people would in fact support decolonization – because of propaganda, non-representative opinion polls and so on… Sure. But there’s no movement for national sovereignty now like it was for ex-soviet states in the 90s! But there hardly is any empirical proof that there’s multitude of nations that have a strong wish for Russia disintegration and independence of parts of Russian Federation. So, to put it simply, you cannot decolonize people who do not want to be decolonized! I think many people demand more decentralization within Russia and more sovereignty or actual decision-making power on a local and regional level – and these are genuine concerns. Now to the second point…

There is an ideological split in Russian society, there are liberal cities and conservative provinces, but it’s by no means an ethnic divide of supposedly anti-western Muscovites and pro-western and liberal ethnic minorities of Russia’s provinces. 

Yes?

There’s this narrative in the West saying that things will be easier after Russia breaks up. “We will have partners to talk to”, people say. And I don’t see why? And why do we essentialize ethnic minorities to the point we think they’re at the core different than other Russian citizens? How are they more liberal, more democratically minded and pro-western than average Russian? We project this image on them, because we would like them to be more like us. In fact there is an ideological split in Russian society, there are liberal cities and conservative provinces, but it’s by no means an ethnic divide of supposedly anti-western Muscovites and pro-western and liberal ethnic minorities of Russia’s provinces.

And finally: „breaking up Russia” as a policy advice. I don’t see how this is supposed to „cure” the problem of Russian imperialism. Russian Federation is 80% ethnic Russian and let’s be sure: these people by no means await the collapse and disintegration of their country. To the contrary: you’d have a very revanchist mood, much more revanchist than today. And in many future possible „ethnic republics” there are Russians, too – sometime more than 50% – and that has to be addressed as well. What happens then when Russia is partitioned – civil wars, clashes between armed factions, conflicts over possession of nuclear arsenal, Moscow’s increased revanchism, phobia and will to retake lost territories and recentralize everything? This certainly doesn’t sound like an easy solution to the problem of Mr Putin to me. 

Ok, let me put forward another argument then. Soviet Bloc and USSR’s collapse eventually produced democratic and prosperous countries – be it Estonia, Poland or Czechia – where there’s certainly no nostalgia for Warsaw Pact and stability of pre 1989 Eastern Europe. Those very countries are strong advocates for more powerful NATO, dynamic EU and military support for Ukraine. Why shouldn’t we – someone might ask – root for the same scenario in the case of Russia’s eventual collapse?

Poland, Czechoslovakia and even to some extent Baltic Soviet Republics were much more independent members of the Soviet Bloc so you cannot compare their fate as easily with what happened after rest of the USSR collapsed and what followed in the 90s. Furthermore, there was strong consensus and international support for integrating these countries into the West. And with the exception of the Baltics, you really cannot point to any other successful examples of post-soviet states.  Nobody else but Baltic States have integrated into NATO and the EU. Ukraine and Moldova did not make any clear move towards functioning democracy and integration with NATO and the EU until very recently. Neither had Central Asia, the Caucasus, Georgia. So we shouldn’t dream and project that what had happened in central Europe is the model of how all possible transitions will go everywhere else. Ukraine’s is doing it’s best today, but even Georgia have faced a lot of backlash, Moldova is even further down the road from EU and NATO, not to speak of other countries. So how we can extrapolate from these examples that territories that had been part of Russian statehood for centuries and have no identity or tradition of independent statehood, and expect it to work? That such new entities will be not only more democratic and peaceful but also more capable to work constructively and engage with the West? It’s all another bad case of projection. 

Why do you think then these proposals are so popular in the western discourse?

Part of the reason is, I think, that they sound somehow familiar and we like what we already know. And the cliches of Russian collapse bring the Soviet collapse – which we know – to mind, as well as the Cold War logic and rhetoric which is also very easy to understand and familiar to audiences in the West. This is how we’re reaching for an easy and accessible framework of thinking about the world. 

But there’s also another tradition of thinking that was long embedded in the policy spheres. Russia as a big country is by definition an imperialist country and therefore is by definition bad. We can remedy this by breaking Russia up – this thinking goes – and preventing the cycle of Russian imperialism from going on. This is rooted in thinking about how Russia is doomed to behaved imperially and only weakening it will prevent Russia from doing so. This geopolitical tradition is indeed still strong in some corners of the debate. But let’s also remember that so called decolonization of Russia is not favored solution among foreign policy decision-makers, nor they think it’s probable or possible. 

Putin believed for a long time, maybe 10-15 years, that he could not only integrate with the West, but also influence neighboring countries in the region by a form of soft power. And this resurgence of imperialism today is I think a sort of “plan B” – after other scenarios failed.

So do you reject the view of Russia as imperialist at the core? 

Yes. I think there’s this danger of explaining everything by Russian imperialism. Putin believed for a long time, maybe 10-15 years, that he could not only integrate with the West, but also influence neighboring countries in the region by a form of soft power. Like: Russia would be most economically prosperous, culturally attractive, magnet for immigrants and an interesting prospect for global tourism. People and investment would come to Russia for all the different reasons. And this resurgence of imperialism today is I think a sort of “plan B” – after other scenarios failed. So I wouldn’t essentialize the imperial identity of Russia. 

That said, there’s a colonial mindset towards other nations in Russian society, just as there is in other Western societies…

Like in France, Belgium, the UK and United States?

Yes. 

So you agree there’s a colonial mindset towards Ukraine?

It’s more complicated than that. There’s sort of Russo-centrism in everything. For example the view of northern Caucasus nations, the notion that we civilized them, brought them culture, education, healthcare and industry – typical European colonial attitude. And there’s also this colonial mindset towards so called ethnic republics – „they don’t have any better choice then Russia. Where will they go? China, Iran, Afghanistan?”. And now regarding Ukraine. You have this long line of public opinion surveys showing the attitude towards Ukraine as one of „brotherly nation”, but also an independent state. You can say for Russian population it was like that for a long time and nobody saw a problem with that. However, it is different with the ruling elite. 

The Russian’s elite’s view of Ukraine is more of a socialist bloc state in former USSR – it can be independent state without an ability to have a sovereign foreign policy and with deference to Moscow.

How so?

I don’t want to get in Putin’s head, but in – let’s say – collective Putin, the elite’s imagination, Ukraine became a shorthand for NATO’s threat against Russia and all hostile intentions. So, this thinking goes, we have to assure continuity of Russia state and preempt this – by either retaking back Ukraine or at least having Ukraine’s unable to make independent geopolitical alliance’s. The Russian’s elite’s view of Ukraine is more of a socialist bloc state in former USSR – it can be independent state without an ability to have a sovereign foreign policy and with deference to Moscow. And when Ukraine elites doesn’t want it, it is them who are illegitimate and anti-Russian. However, if you look at surveys, for a very long time the Russian population was not asking for Ukraine to be integrated into Russian territory…

It’s a rather mild word for „occupation” If I dare say. 

This is how it’s framed in polls in Russia. But even when it’s framed this way, it doesn’t get much support. So we have to understand, that this imperialism projected by the elities and the broader attitudes of the society, which aren’t sold on that. 

If we wish to see some kind of pacified Russia, there will be a need for some degree of decentralization. And that’s exactly the argument I’m trying to bring. There will be no democratization in Russia unless people in regions will get a say in their own affairs.

Let me ask you about a positive argument and a policy advice… how does this end?

If we wish to see some kind of pacified Russia, there will be a need for some degree of decentralization. And that’s exactly the argument I’m trying to bring. There will be no democratization in Russia unless people in regions will get a say in their own affairs. 

And if this doesn’t happen and Russia’s central government finds itself in a deep trouble, than what?

Well, Russia have a historical experience of a civil war. And in case of risk of a state collapse, you’ll see the effects of totally militarized political culture in Russia today – exacerbated by popular mobilization. You have these volunteer groups, tons of mercenaries, beneficiaries of paramilitarization of the Russian state, figures like Prigozhin etc… I cannot imagine these sorts of people not turning to arms in order to prevent the state from collapsing. Because you have to realize, many of them remember this happening only 30 years before and do not want to happen once again in their lifetimes. Security services and paramiliatries also… Let’s say that such a hypothetical Russian civil war will not be between – let’s say – the Chechens and the Ingush, but…

Russian security agencies trying to defend their positions of privilege using all means at their disposal?

Yes! I cannot imagine these people dealing with the collapse on the scale of the one from 30 years ago any other way. Think also of the mafia state, export of drugs and weapons, refugees… What happens with Kaliningrad? The global cost of managing this will be enormous. People can assure themselves it will be elevated cost for maybe ten years and than everything will be easier, but even in such a scenario, we should be preparing for this. First and foremost it will generate cost for Europe – and the difference is that Europe of today is not ready for cost of such instability today. We have to ask ourselves then – is it worth taking the risks? 

 

Marlene Laruelle is the Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. Her most recent book is „Is Russia fascist? Unraveling Propaganda East and West”.