War, Politics, Life

The vast majority of Ukrainians have no doubt that the stakes of the war with Russia are the highest possible. In surveys conducted since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, there is a recurring belief that Moscow’s goal is the elimination of Ukrainian national agency, and genocide, even if not biologically, then culturally and in terms of identity. This belief is not a Russophobic fantasy; Russian goals were clearly communicated by Vladimir Putin in speeches preparing for the aggression. Also in the Russian press at the beginning of the war, one could read unambiguous descriptions of the technology of conquest: after seizing territory, symbols of statehood are eliminated, then local elites are eliminated, and the rest of the population is subjected to ‘perekovkas’ using propaganda and violence.

This technology was experienced by the residents of occupied Kherson, a regional center in southern Ukraine, which Ukrainian forces managed to liberate in late fall 2022. Yuri Kerpatenko, the conductor of Kherson’s Mykola Kulish Music and Drama Theater, did not live to see freedom. When he refused to let the Russians play to their order, he was executed. So were many others.

So Ukrainians have no doubt that they are fighting for everything. And they have no doubt that if Russia is not broken, sooner or later it will attack again fulfilling its eternal imperial goal. Because the current war is not the implementation of Putin’s psychopathic inclinations, but a repeat of the historical pattern set by such tragic events as the destruction of Baturyn (then capital of the Hetmanate, or Cossack state) in 1708, and the slaughter of Kyiv by Mikhail Muravyov in March 1918.

The power of resistance

These few basics explain Ukrainian determination, but they do not explain the ability to resist a much stronger opponent. The Russian army is still among the strongest in the world in terms of human potential and weaponry. The Russian state, fed by revenues from the sale of oil, natural gas, grain and raw materials sold abroad despite sanctions, is still able to finance the war and provide a decent standard of living for its people. For Ukraine, the shock of the war meant the collapse of the economy and a drop in GDP by nearly 30% in 2022, the forced emigration of millions of people and the occupation of parts of its territory.

Ukraine, however, did not collapse. The Russians failed to carry out a blitzkrieg and conquest in a few days in February 2022. Volodymyr Zelensky did not flee, although allies offered assistance in evacuation. And Ukrainians did not greet the Russian ‘liberators’ with flowers. The symbol of their response became the loud “Russian man-of-war, go f… yourself!” heard by the crew of the cruiser ‘Moskva’ attacking a Ukrainian border guard post on Zmiiny Island in the Black Sea. The Russians not only failed to capture Kyiv, but also quickly began to retreat from near the capital, then had to leave from near Kharkiv succumbing to the offensive led by General Syrsky, the current Commander-in-Chief. The sinking of the cruiser, the recapture of Viper Island, and the liberation of Kherson became achievements showing that it was possible to win against the Russians. In fact, they so warmed Ukrainian enthusiasm fueled by official propaganda that as late as 2022 there was widespread belief in the possibility of a quick, victorious end to the war.

Back to reality

Enthusiasm faded in late 2023 and early 2024, when the last hopes attached to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, undertaken in the summer of 2023, vanished. It had no effect; rather, it led to the perpetuation of the positional nature of the war, in which progress is measured in terms of individual meters of ground snatched from the enemy. What happened? The answer is complex. The Russians proved more resilient than anyone thought to human and material losses. The Ukrainians, less ready to sacrifice soldiers’ lives in “butchery attacks,” counted on the firepower of armaments supplied by the allies. Only they did not receive it in adequate quantities, as they fell victim to, among other things, a months-long political blockade in the US Congress. The technology of war has also changed, with drones and radio-electronic warfare methods becoming crucial.

General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the time, summed up the conclusions of the counteroffensive in an essay for The Economist: according to NATO’s tactical manuals, we should be back and forth in Crimea several times. It’s just that given the new realities of war, NATO’s manuals have turned out to be less thanuseful scrap paper, as is being reported today by, among others, US military officials happy to have a laboratory in Ukraine to observe the development of new technologies, tactics and strategy-making.

Democracy at war

The counteroffensive has also failed because, as Professor Yevhen Holovacha, head of the Institute of Sociology at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, explained to me, in this war the totalitarian state is the aggressor, and democracy is the defender. For Putin, it is still a relatively minor problem to get recruits, for Ukraine the biggest socio-political challenge has been mobilization. Holovacha points out that it is not a lack of political will. Gen. Zaluzhny asked President Zelensky for an additional 500,000 troops. He didn’t get it, and the new mobilization law went into effect after long political tinkering in the Verkhovna Rada in May this year.

Why? Because, as various studies have shown, the mobilization issue has highlighted all the problems of the Ukrainian state and society. Most importantly, it highlighted the lack of trust in the institutions of public power. Yes, in 2022 all sociological indicators skyrocketed, but already by the end of 2023 many of them began to move towards the pre-war ‘norm,’ reflecting the belief that politicians and government officials are thinking more about themselves and their own interests than the general good. The hot topic identified as the most important next to the war itself became corruption. This belief was accompanied by the conviction that whoever had money or connections need not fear going into the military.

This was confirmed by stories of chaotic conscription services acting according to the principle of least effort, such as, for example, obtaining recruits in villages whose residents had nowhere to hide; and more stories of bribery at border crossings and at conscription committees. Since, despite the war and martial law restrictions, the press in Ukraine is free from censorship, all examples of abuse, as well as arrests of corrupt officials, get to the public. This gives the impression that the scale of these abuses is larger than it actually is, explained Andriy Borovyk, director of the Ukrainian branch of Transparency International. Moreover, the situation is actually improving and the anti-corruption court is, despite the war, the most effective element of the Ukrainian justice system.

War of consumer society

Nevertheless, mobilization is still a problem in which, as Prof. Holovacha argues, not only the peculiarities of the Ukrainian state and society, but also the broader problem of liberal democracy become apparent. Its essence is expressed by the following question: how, in a democratic, liberal society that respects freedom of choice, can people be expected to make sacrifices, including the sacrifice of their lives for the sake of common values? It is not about a theoretical or formal answer invoking, for example, the Constitution which imposes an obligation to defend the homeland. It is about everyday social and political reality, when life and death must be decided by invoking a democratic mandate.

But there is also another dimension to this problem. Modern societies, including liberal democracies, are driven by a consumption-based economy served by expanded service, entertainment and cultural sectors. They cannot be shut down for the duration of the war, because they have to pay the taxes from which the army is financed. As President Zelenskysaid, it takes six people working in the national economy to support one soldier. And it is not just about numbers, but also about the structure of employment. Should a good IT specialist be on the front lines, or should he be writing drone software?

Ukrainians negotiate the answer all the time, both through journalism, and practical debate. Many young men are reluctant to go into the military simply for fear of losing their health or lives. If they have not managed to flee abroad, they hide in Ukraine. One way is to avoid official employment, which spells trouble for Ukrainian businesses. Difficulties with conscription are prompting creative responses from individual military units. Frontline brigades are recruiting with modern marketing tools, convincing people that service does not have to be hell, but a job that allows them to realize and develop their passions and skills. And there is still no shortage of people who, like Serhiy Zhadian, choose to enlist as volunteers.

A system of resilience

The war in Ukraine has shown that an imperfect state and a non-ideal society can build a brilliantly functioning system of resistance and resilience capable of opposing a potentially much stronger opponent. This system would not have existed without the Maydan of 2013 and 2014, which indeed turned out to be a socio-political revolution. It launched, as Ukrainian sociologists write, a process of national and civic crystallization, which accelerated after the invasion transforming into national and civic consolidation. The revolution itself, and then the defense of statehood after Russia’s first attack on Crimea and Donbas in the spring of 2014, forced the search for new forms of collective action adequate to the threats.

Public involvement in the creation and maintenance of the armed forces has shaped the special nature of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which show the characteristics of a people’s army always directly connected with society. As a result, today the AFU is the pillar that Ukrainians overwhelmingly point to when asked about the most important factor determining the source of Ukrainian resilience. Thanks to the army and air defense, a near-normal life is possible in Ukraine, outside the frontline areas. And Ukrainians enjoy this life in accordance with the principle of “war-life balance,” attributed to the artist Yuri Stetsik, who joined the army as a volunteer in the early days. He argued that war was not the end of life, but a long and arduous job. And as with a job, it also requires moments of respite. Stetsik disappeared in December 2022.

War as a job

And it is the approach to the reality of war, both on and off the front lines, that determines that Ukraine not only resists, but also remains a functioning state. Ukrainian railroads somehow handle traffic and boast that more than 90% of long-distance trains arrive on time. And they remind us that this reliability has cost the lives of more than 700 railway men and women. Ukrainian Olympians pleased their compatriots with medals won at the Paris Games, but the sacrifice of more than 500 athletes and coaches killed in the war is behind their successes.

Despite the difficulties, government agencies are at work documenting every Russian crime. Hundreds of prosecutors are collecting evidence on the destruction of the Novaya Kakhovka hydroelectric plant. They are supported by employees of the Kherson State Sanitary Inspectorate risking their lives every day while collecting samples from the Dnieper River. Inspectors and investigators document each bomb attack and its consequences. They are supported in this by civic organizations. Because the goal of the war is not only to regain full sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also peace based on the principle of justice, according to which criminals will be punished for their deeds.

Leap into adulthood

The foundation of the war-life balance principle is the realization that every element of normal life that Ukrainians try to enjoy by going to work, filling cafes and theaters staging premieres, buying new wartime-written books in newly opened bookstores, or going to concerts, costs not only the nominal price paid in hryvnias, but also the highest price paid with the blood of tens of thousands of the fallen and wounded. Hanna Vasyk, a doctor of philosophy and cultural manager, now a sergeant in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said at the Yalta European Strategy conference that Ukrainian men and women chose to resist in order to defend the values and way of life that are important to them. By taking responsibility for themselves, they have shown that they have become an adult nation and society. She concluded by asking if other European nations were equally adult. Because everybody knows that they are old.